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PERSPECTIVAS   PERSPECTIVES
Secularity matters to health policies. Secularity 
is more than religious neutrality in government 
affairs – it is a condition for governability in a 
plural and democratic state. In health, it matters 
where government leaders seek inspiration for 
their official acts, whether in academic knowl-
edge or in religions. The post-modern concern 
over the statute of truth is insufficient to strip sci-
ence of its value for public policymaking. Thus, 
not everything in the moral field is fair grounds 
for health practices in duties to the citizens of a 
secular state.
My argument is simple – religion should be 
a matter of private ethics, and public policies 
should not be based on religious mystics con-
cerning welfare. Therefore, psychotherapy aimed 
at reversing homosexuality is not good scientific 
practice, but quackery. Likewise, banning em-
bryonic stem cell research with the pretense of 
safeguarding the frozen embryo’s right to life is 
religious dogma and not a serious discussion on 
the morphology of human genesis. Science or 
quackery, research or dogma, are not adjectives 
to qualify practices, but political nouns.
It is with a political noun that I intend to 
provoke the principal expression of the Brazil-
ian state’s weak secularity in health – the growing 
concern over conscientious objection as a device. 
What does conscientious objection mean? In this 
case it is health professionals’ denial, on purport-
ed moral grounds, of their duty to provide care. 
The most common scenario is that of abortion: 
physicians, nurses, social workers, or psycholo-
gists, each according to their own knowledge 
and power systems, refuse to assist a woman 
who wishes to undergo an abortion. This is not 
new today, when the Congressional Committee 
on Human Rights is chaired by a fundamentalist 
pastor. Severina’s story took place in 2004, a few 
days after a preliminary injunction that allowed 
abortion in cases of anencephaly was overruled 
by the Brazilian Supreme Court 1,2. Even with a 
court authorization in force, the anesthetists at 
the hospital where the patient was referred for 
a legal abortion refused to assist her – claiming 
religious grounds.
Severina was Catholic and failed to under-
stand why a court ruling was not enough to 
guarantee her right to the abortion. Her proof 
of identity was her worker’s card – an existential 
imprint of her class and origin. She waited for 
hours: carrying a non-viable fetus, was incapable 
of convincing those who had the duty to assist 
her. Her potential caregivers claimed they were in 
moral suffering: the abortion was a grave threat 
to their feeling of religious integrity. Thus, their 
refusal was supposedly a legitimate form of ob-
jection. No anesthetist at the hospital stepped up 
to relieve her pain. Severina waited and trekked 
from one hospital to another. She was finally as-
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sisted by a volunteer anesthetist from a private 
clinic, to perform an induced abortion in a public 
hospital.
Conscientious objection can be interpreted 
as a fundamental right or as protection of a sen-
timent. In terms of public health policies, my 
provocation is to understand conscientious ob-
jection as a device for protecting sentiments, and 
can be guaranteed by administrative measures 
for internal accommodation in health services. 
Yes, I dare to re-describe the device of conscien-
tious objection as an adjustment of protection, 
but not as an absolute right when it threatens 
health needs. I explain: I wish to believe that 
we should all have the inalienable right to civil 
disobedience – resisting conscription into wars 
is a example. We want a state that protects our 
individual rights, whether to profess beliefs or 
to march for freedoms. But it does not suffice 
to declare freedom of thought and expression 
in order for conscientious objection to also be 
claimed as an absolute and universal right – at 
least in healthcare.
If that were the case, public healthcare ser-
vices would suffer a dire threat from the growing 
juxtaposition of religions and rights in Brazilian 
politics. From administrative staff to physicians 
and nurses, all would be protected by the Consti-
tutional principle of freedom of conscience when 
renouncing their professional duties, whether to 
complete a hospital admissions form, perform 
an abortion, or simply to help clean a patient. 
The possibilities are exponential and intimidat-
ing for whoever seeks to allay afflictions, fears, or 
pain in healthcare services. Such is the case with 
a woman who has been raped when she reaches 
the critical route to abortion in public services. 
But it could pertain equally to other situations 
in which moralities and duties cross paths with 
rights and needs.
Some claim that doctors cannot be consci-
entious objectors. The refusal to provide care 
would be inconsistent with the very nature of the 
medical profession 3. I see this as a view based 
more on ideal professional types than on real 
people, whose moral life is both a choice and a 
legacy. Rather than confronting physicians’ be-
liefs and weaknesses, the solution is to organize 
the tense interface between dogmas, sentiments, 
and health needs. Individuals are free to become 
doctors. An abortion is exclusively a medical act, 
and it is prohibited for nurses or midwives to per-
form one, even in remote areas of the country. 
Physicians are free to profess their moral beliefs, 
religious or otherwise. A woman is free to de-
cide whether to have an abortion if she has been 
raped. This is the tense scenario involving suffer-
ing and rights: women want to have the right to 
abortion and do not want to be assisted by physi-
cians in suffering.
There are at least two approaches for deal-
ing with the issue of conscientious objection in 
a secular framework of public health policies, 
that is, where religious beliefs are not absolute, 
nor do they define the political pact. The first wa-
gers that administrative adjustments in health 
services are capable of harmonizing needs and 
sentiments. In biomedical language, there would 
be measures for regulation and prevention: (a) 
organizing hospital work shifts without consci-
entious objectors and (b) non-participation by 
conscientious objectors in practices contrary to 
their conscience. The Pérola Byington Hospital in 
São Paulo, one of the referral centers in Brazil for 
legal abortion, was daring in a preventive mea-
sure – the recent admissions process for hiring 
a psychologist for the hospital’s staff was explicit 
in relation to this specific future government em-
ployee’s job description, namely, being assigned 
to the hospital’s legal abortion service. But the 
second approach interests me more here: it is 
necessary to remove the conscientious objection 
issue from the religious sphere and situate it in 
the field of relations of power and domination.
A secular state believes in the sincerity of its 
citizens’ beliefs. Physicians who claim conscien-
tious objection due to religious suffering vis-à-
vis caring for the sexual health of a homosexual 
man or a female rape victim should be heard in 
terms of their pain. Caring for their anguish is 
not the same as guaranteeing civil disobedience 
in their duties. The juxtaposition of suffering and 
the right to conscientious objection results from 
the hegemony of medical power rather than from 
a well-considered measure of health justice. A 
raped woman who seeks a legal abortion and is 
confronted by medical teams with conscientious 
objectors suffers discrimination, beyond the un-
just denial of the care she deserves. Thus, if it is 
possible to acknowledge conscientious objection 
through an institutional arrangement of health-
care teams, it is also fair to state that health insti-
tutions have the duty to guarantee care, without 
women having to be vexed by individual claims 
to deny them treatment.
The truth is that conscientious objection 
does not extend to all individuals as an abso-
lute personal right. The technical norms that 
regulate legal abortion in Brazil are reserved for 
individuals directly involved in abortion proce-
dures, that is, physicians 4. On the one hand, if 
this moral reserve is a relief for women and their 
health needs, on the other it reflects what is pro-
tected by conscientious objection as a medical 
device – hierarchies rather than beliefs. Medical 
hegemony is safeguarded when one allows that 
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physicians’ sentiments are untouchable. But the 
abortion taboo as a religious issue is also reaf-
firmed when conscientious objection becomes 
a medical right. After all, secularity becomes an 
adjective for public policies rather than a noun to 
legitimize political practices for justice in health.
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